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Abstract
The collection of large datasets allows for ad-
vanced analytics that can lead to improved quality
of life and progress in applications such as ma-
chine cognition and medical analysis. However,
recently there has been an increased pressure to
guarantee the privacy of users when collecting
data. In this work, we study how adversarial rep-
resentation learning can be used to ensure the pri-
vacy of users, and to obfuscate sensitive attributes
in existing datasets. While previous methods us-
ing adversarial representation learning for privacy
only aims at obfuscating the sensitive information,
we find that adding new information in its place
can improve the strength of the provided privacy.
We propose a method building on generative ad-
versarial networks that has two steps in the data
privatization. In the first step, sensitive data is re-
moved from the representation. In the second step,
a sample which is independent of the input data
is inserted in its place. The result is an approach
that can provide stronger privatization on image
data, and yet be preserving both the domain and
the utility of the inputs.
1. Introduction
The list of success stories from big data analytics can be
made long. Statistical studies for medical diagnosis (Litjens
et al., 2017) and business analytics (Chen et al., 2012) are
merely a couple of examples. The amounts of data required
for training machine learning models for the processing of
natural language and images are growing with the scale
and capabilities of the models (Goodfellow et al., 2016).
However, collecting large datasets which potentially contain
sensitive information about individuals can be difficult be-
cause getting the consent from people may be challenging.
Furthermore, privacy laws are being incorporated in many
countries to protect the rights of individuals, making it hard
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to use data with sensitive information. Being able to give
privacy guarantees on a dataset may be a way to allow the
distribution of the data, while protecting the rights of indi-
viduals, and thus unlocking the large benefits for individuals
and for society that big datasets can provide.
In this work, we study techniques for selective anonymiza-
tion of image datasets. The end goal is to provide the orig-
inal data as detailed as possible and retain the most infor-
mation from it, while at the same time making it hard for
an adversary to detect specific sensitive attributes. The pro-
posed solution is agnostic to the downstream task, with the
objective to make the data as private as possible given a
distortion constraint.
Previous research has addressed this issue using adversarial
representation learning with some success: a filter model
is trained to hide sensitive information while an adversary
model is trained to recover the information. While previ-
ous work had the objective of training the filter model so
that it is hard for the adversary to uncover the sensitive at-
tributes (Huang et al., 2018), we instead explore this task
under the assumption that it is easier to hide sensitive in-
formation if you replace it with something else: a sample
which is independent from the input data.
In our setup, the adversary can make an arbitrary number
of queries to the model, each time another sample will be
produced from the distribution of the sensitive data, while
keeping as much as possible of the non-sensitive information
about the requested data point.
Besides the adversary module, our proposed solution in-
cludes two main components: one filter model that is trained
to remove the sensitive information, and one generator
model that inserts a synthetically generated new value for
the sensitive attribute. The generated sensitive information
is entirely independent from the sensitive information in the
original input image. Following a body of work in privacy-
related adversarial learning we evaluate the proposed model
on faces from the CelebA dataset, and consider, for example,
the smile of a person to be the sensitive attribute. The smile
is an attribute that carries interesting aspects in the transfor-
mations of a human face. Even if the obvious change reside
close to the mouth, subtle changes occur in many other parts
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of the face when a person smiles: eyelids tighten, dimples
may occur and the skin may wrinkle. The current work
also includes a thorough analysis of the dataset, including
correlations of such features. These correlations make the
task interesting and challenging, reflecting the real difficulty
that may occur when anonymizing data. What is the right
trade-off between preserving the utility as defined by al-
lowing information about other attributes to remain, and
removing the sensitive information? Our method is easily
generalizable and can be applied to other visual attributes
such as gender, race, background cues, etc.
2. Related work
Adversarial learning is the process of training a model with
the objective of being able to fool an adversary (a second
model). The adversary is trained simultaneously, and both
become increasingly good at their respective task during the
training process. This approach has been successfully used
to learn image-to-image transformations (Isola et al., 2017),
and synthesis of properties such as facial expressions (Song
et al., 2017; Tang et al., 2019). Privacy-preserving adversar-
ial representation learning studies how to utilize this learn-
ing framework to learn representations of data that hide
some sensitive information, yet retain the utility. Adversar-
ial learning has also been used to train generative models
(Goodfellow et al., 2014).
A body of prior work has been dedicated to employ adversar-
ial representation learning to hide sensitive attributes while
retaining the useful information (Edwards & Storkey, 2016;
Zhang et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2017; Beutel et al., 2017;
Raval et al., 2017). Bertran et al. (2019) presented a privacy
preserving mechanism that minimizes the mutual informa-
tion between the utility variable and the input image data
conditioned on the learned representation. Chandan Roy
& Naresh Boddeti (2019) proposed that the generator in
the adversarial learning setup should be optimized to max-
imize the entropy of the discriminator output rather than
to minimize the log likelihood. The authors show that this
is beneficial in the multi-class setting. Osia et al. (2020)
treated the problem as an information-bottleneck problem.
The resulting images are optimized to be useful to predict a
specific binary attribute, while hiding the identify of a per-
son. Wu et al. (2018), Wang et al. (2019), Ren et al. (2018)
studied how to learn transformations of video that respect a
privacy budget while maintaining performance on the down-
stream task. Tran et al. (2018) proposed an approach for
solving pose-invariant face recognition. Similar to our work,
their approach used adversarial representation learning to
disentangling specific attributes in the data. Oh et al. (2017)
trained an obfuscator network to add a minimal amount of
perturbation noise to the input to make the output fool a
person recognition adversary.
All these proposed solutions, with the exception of Edwards
& Storkey (2016), depend on knowing the downstream task
labels. Our work has no such dependency: the data pro-
duced by our method is designed to be usable regardless of
downstream task.
The work most closely related to ours is that by Huang
et al. (2017) and Huang et al. (2018). They use adversarial
learning to minimize the mutual information between the
private attribute and the censored image under a distortion
constraint. We extend on these ideas by proposing a modular
design consisting of a filter that is adversarially trained
to obfuscate the data points, and a generator that further
enhances the privacy by adding new independently sampled
synthetic information for the sensitive attributes. Our work
is closely connected to the learning of fair representations
(Zemel et al., 2013), and the proposed generator module
could be applied to counterfactual reasoning in a fashion
similar to Johansson et al. (2016) by allowing to control the
private attribute input to the generator deterministically.
Some prior work has assumed access to a privacy-preserving
mechanism, such as bounding boxes for faces, and has stud-
ied to what extent the identity of a person can be hidden
when blurring (Oh et al., 2016a), removing (Orekondy et al.,
2018) or generating the face of another person (Hukkela˚s
et al., 2019) in its place. Other work has assumed access
to the utility-preserving mechanism and proposed to obfus-
cate everything except what they want to retain (Alharbi
et al., 2019). But this raises the question: how do we find
the pixels in an image that need to be modified to preserve
privacy with respect to some attribute, or alternatively the
pixels that need to be kept to preserve utility? Furthermore,
Oh et al. (2016b) showed that blurring or removing the head
of a person has a limited effect on privacy with respect to
person recognition. The finding is crucial; we cannot rely on
modifications of an image such as blurring or overpainting
to achieve privacy.
An adversarial set-up instead captures the signals that the
adversary uses, and can attain a stronger privacy.
3. Privacy-preserving adversarial
representation learning
In the current work, we focus on utility-preserving transfor-
mations of data: we use privacy-preserving representation
learning to obfuscate information in the input data, and seek
to output results that retain the information and structure of
the input.
3.1. Problem setting
Generative adversarial privacy (GAP) (Huang et al., 2018)
was proposed as a method to provide privacy while main-
taining the utility of an image dataset, which will be used
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as the baseline in the current work. In GAP, one assumes
a joint distribution P (X,S) of public data points X and
sensitive private attributes S where S is typically corre-
lated with X . The authors define a privacy mechanism
X ′ = f(X,Z1) where Z1 is the source of noise or random-
ness in f . Let hf (X ′) be an adversary’s prediction of the
sensitive attribute S from the privatized data X ′ according
to a decision rule hf . The performance of the adversary is
thus measured by a loss function `(hf (f(x, z1)), s) and the
expected loss of the adversary with respect to X , S and Z1
is
Lf (hf , f) = E
x,s∼p(x,s)
z1∼p(z1)
[`f (hf (f(x, z1), s)], (1)
where p(z1) is the source of noise.
The privacy mechanism f should be privacy-preserving and
utility-preserving. That is, it should be hard for an analyst to
infer S from X ′, but X ′ should be minimally distorted with
respect to X . The authors (Huang et al., 2018) formulate
this as a constrained minimax problem
min
f
max
hf
− Lf (f, hf )
s.t. E
x,s∼p(x,s)
z1∼p(z1)
[d(f(x, z1), x)] ≤ 1,
where the constant 1 ≥ 0 defines the allowed distortion for
the privatizer and d(·, ·) is some distortion measure.
In the current work, we call the privacy mechanism f the
filter since the purpose of f(x, z1) is to filter the sensitive
information from x. A potential drawback with this formu-
lation is that it only removes the sensitive information in
x which may make it obvious to the adversary that x′ is
a censored version of x. Instead, in addition to removing
the sensitive information we propose to replace it with a
new value s′ that is sampled from the uniform distribution1,
independent of s.
3.2. Our contribution
We extend the filter with an additional module which we
call the generator. We define the generator mechanism as
X ′′ = g(f(X,Z1), S′, Z2) where S′ denotes the random
variable of the new synthetic sensitive attribute, and Z1
and Z2 are the sources of noise or randomness in f and g
respectively. The discriminator hg is then trained to pre-
dict s when the input is a real image, and to predict the
“fake” output when the input comes from g as in the semi-
supervised learning setup in (Salimans et al., 2016). The
objective of the generator g(x′, s′, z2) is to generate a new
synthetic (independent) sensitive attribute s′ in x′, that will
1The uniform distribution is a close approximation of the
marginal distribution of the smiling attribute.
Figure 1. An overview of the training setup. This figure does not
show the discriminators.
fool the discriminator hg. We further define the loss of the
discriminator hg as
Lg(hg, g) =E
x,s∼p(x,s)
s′∼p(s′)
z1,z2∼p(z1,z2)
[`g(hg(g(f(x, z1), s
′, z2)), fake)]
+E
x,s∼p(x,s)
[`g(hg(x), s)],
where p(z1, z2) is the source of noise, p(s′) is the assumed
distribution of the synthetic sensitive attributes s′, fake is
the fake class, and `g is the loss function. We formulate this
as a constrained minimax problem
min
g
max
hg
− Lg(g, hg)
s.t. E
x,s∼p(x,s)
s′∼p(s′)
z1,z2∼p(z1,z2)
[d(g(f(x, z1), s
′, z2), x)] ≤ 2,
where the constant 2 ≥ 0 defines the allowed distortion
for the generator. An overview of the setup can be seen in
Figure 1.
3.3. Data-driven implementation
Typically, we do not have access to the true data distribu-
tion P (X,S), but we have access to a dataset of samples
D = {(xi, si)}ni=1 which are assumed to be identically and
independently distributed according to the unknown joint
distribution P (X,S). We assume that the sensitive attribute
is binary and takes values in {0, 1}. However, the proposed
approach can easily be extended to categorical sensitive at-
tributes. We model the filter mechanism f(X,Z1; θf ) with
a convolutional neural network parameterized by θf and the
generator mechanism g(X ′, S′, Z2; θg) with a convolutional
neural network parameterized by θg . We use the UNet (Ron-
neberger et al., 2015) architecture for both the filter and the
generator, as illustrated in Figure 2. The orange blocks are
convolution blocks each of which, except for the last block,
consist of a convolution layer, a batch normalization layer
and a rectified linear activation unit, repeated twice in that
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order. The number of output channels of the convolution
layers in each block has been noted in Figure 2. The last
convolution block with a 3 channel output (the RGB image)
consists of only a single convolutional layer followed by a
sigmoid activation. The green blocks denote either a max
pooling layer with a kernel size of two and a stride of two if
marked with “/2” or a nearest neighbor upsampling by a fac-
tor of two if marked with “2x”. The blue block denotes an
embedding layer, which takes as input the categorical value
of the sensitive attribute and outputs a dense embedding of
128 dimensions. It is then followed by a linear projection
and a reshaping to match the spatial dimensions of the out-
put of the convolution block to which it is concatenated, but
with a single channel. The same type of linear projection
is applied on the 1024 dimensional noise vector input, but
this projection and reshaping matches both the spatial and
channel dimensions of the output of the convolutional block
to which it is concatenated. Concatenation is in both cases
done along the channel dimension.
The discriminators hf (X ′;φf ) and hg(X ′′;φg) are mod-
eled using ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016) and a modified ver-
sion which we refer to as ResNet-102, respectively. The last
fully connected layer has been replaced with a two and three
class output layer for each model, respectively.
The algorithm used to train the filter, the generator, and the
discriminators is described in Algorithm 1 where the loss
function `f for the filter is the entropy of its output, the
loss functions `fd and `g are categorical cross entropy, the
distortion measure d is defined as the L2-norm, and p(s′)
is assumed to be the uniform distribution U{0, 1}. The
hyperparameters consist of the learning rate lr, the quadratic
penalty term coefficient λ, the distortion constraint , and
the (β1, β2) parameters to Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014). We
also include results where `f is the categorical cross entropy
as in the baseline.
4. Experiments
In this section we describe our experiments, the dataset used
to evaluate the method and the evaluation metrics. We have
evaluated our method on the facial images from the CelebA
dataset (Liu et al., 2015)3.
The preservation of utility for a downstream task is mea-
sured by training a classifier to detect non-sensitive at-
tributes in the censored images, which are known from
the original dataset.
2ResNet-10 has the same setup as ResNet-18, but each of the
“conv2 x”, “conv3 x”, “conv4 x”, and “conv5 x” layers consists
of only one block instead of two.
3http://mmlab.ie.cuhk.edu.hk/projects/CelebA.html
Algorithm 1
input: D, lr, λ, , β1, β2
1, 2 ← 
repeat
Draw m samples uniformly at random from the dataset
(x1, s1), . . . , (xm, sm) ∼ D
Draw m samples from the noise distribution
(z
(1)
1 , z
(2)
1 ), . . . , (z
(1)
m , z
(2)
m ) ∼ p(z(1), z(2))
Draw m samples from the synthetic distribution
s′1, . . . , s
′
m ∼ p(s′)
Compute censored and synthetic data
x′1, . . . , x
′
m = fθf (x1, z
(1)
1 ), . . . , fθf (xm, z
(1)
m )
x′′1 , . . . , x
′′
m = gθg (x
′
1, s
′
1, z
(2)
1 ), . . . , gθg (x
′
m, s
′
m, z
(2)
m )
Compute filter and generator losses
Θf (θf ) = − 1
m
m∑
i=1
`f (hf (x
′
i;φf ), si)
+ λmax(
1
m
m∑
i=1
d(x′i, xi)− , 0)2
Θg(θg) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
`g(hg(x
′′
i ;φg), si)
+ λmax(
1
m
m∑
i=1
d(x′′i , xi)− , 0)2
Update filter and generator parameters
θf ← θf − lr∇θf Θf (θf )
θg ← θg − lr∇θgΘg(θg)
Compute discriminator losses
Φf (φf ) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 `fd(hf (x
′
i;φf ), si)
Φg(φg) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
`g(hg(x
′′
i ;φg), fake)
+
1
m
m∑
i=1
`g(hg(xi;φg), si)
Update discriminator parameters
φf ← Adam(φf ; lr, β1, β2)
φg ← Adam(φg; lr, β1, β2)
until stopping criterion
return θf , θg, φf , φg
4.1. CelebA
The CelebA dataset (Liu et al., 2015) consists of 202,599
face images of size 218x178 pixels and 40 binary attribute
annotations per image, such as age (old or young), gender,
if the image is blurry, if the person is bald, etc. We include
experiments where we use the smiling attribute and the
gender attribute from CelebA, respectively as the sensitive
variable to censor and synthesize. The dataset has an official
split into a training set of 162,770 images, a validation set
Adversarial representation learning for synthetic replacement of private attributes
Figure 2. The architecture of the filter and generator networks.
The notation x/x′, z1/z2, and /s′ means that the network takes
these inputs and gives as output x′/x′′ for the filter / generator
respectively. In the filter we do not use the embedding branch.
of 19,867 images and a test set of 19,962 images. We resize
all images to 64x64 pixels and normalize all pixel values to
the region [0, 1], unless otherwise is specified.
4.2. Filtering and replacement of sensitive data
Let Dtrain = {(xi, si}ni=1 be a set of training data where
xi denotes facial image i and si ∈ {0, 1} denotes the
sensitive attribute (either smiling or gender). Further let
Dtest = {(xi, si)}mi=1 be the held out test data. Since we
evaluate on CelebA (Liu et al., 2015) we have n = 162, 770
for the training data and m = 19, 867 for the test data. We
also, for the purpose of evaluation only, assume access to a
number of utility attributes ui ∈ {0, 1} for each xi. We con-
sider the utility attributes gender, wearing lipstick, young,
high cheekbones, mouth slightly open, heavy makeup, and
exclude the one currently used as the sensitive attribute for
each experiment. The utility attributes are used to evaluate
how well non-sensitive attributes are preserved after the
images have been censored.
Let θf and θg denote the parameters of the filter and genera-
tor, respectively, obtained by Algorithm 1 applied to Dtrain
with lr = 0.0005, λ = 105,  ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.001, 0.005},
and (β1, β2) = (0.9, 0.999). We can then define the train-
ing data censored by the filter as D′train = {(x′i, si)}ni=1,
where x′i = f(xi, z
(1)
i ; θf ) and the training data censored
by the filter and the generator as D′′train = {(x′′i , si)}
where x′′i = g(x
′
i, s
′
i, z
(2)
i ; θg), z
(1)
i , z
(2)
i ∼ N (0,1), and
s′i ∼ U{0, 1}. We do the same transformations to the test
data and denote them D′test and D′′test respectively.
Each experiment is run on a Tesla V100 SXM2 32 GB in
a DGX-1 machine. The training is restricted to 100 epochs
which takes about 13 hours.
To evaluate the two methods we use four different met-
rics. We train three adversarial classifiers pf (s|·), pg(s|·)
and pg◦f (s|·) to predict the ground truth smile of a person
given an image censored by the baseline, only the generator,
and our method respectively. That is, we train the adversary
pf (s|·) onD′train and evaluate the accuracy of the adversary
on D′test to measure how predictable the sensitive attribute
is from an image censored by the baseline in this adver-
sarial setting, and similarly we train the adversary pg(s|·)
and pg◦f (s|·) on their respective censored training sets and
evaluate the accuracy on their respective testing sets.
In addition, we train a classifier pψ(u|·) to predict the gender
of a person in an image on the original uncensored training
data and use it as a measure to see how well the gender
attribute is preserved after censoring the data. We also train
a classifier pη(s|·) to predict the smile of a person in the
image on the original uncensored training data and use it as
a measure to see how well the smile is censored.
To quantify the image quality of the censored images x′ and
x′′ we use the Fre´chet Inception Distance (FID) (Heusel
et al., 2017). This is a metric frequently used in GAN
literature to measure image quality.
5. Results
In this section we present quantitative and qualitative results
on the facial image experiments.
5.1. Quantitative results
Figure 3 shows the trade-off between privacy and utility
using the strong adversarially trained classifiers pf (s|·),
pg(s|·) and pg◦f (s|·) when evaluated on images censored
by the baseline and our method respectively. With these ad-
versaries, which are much stronger than the fixed classifiers,
our method consistently has a higher utility at any given
level of privacy compared to the baseline. Remember: these
adversaries require to run tagged training data through the
privacy mechanism to be able to train.
Table 1 shows the accuracy of the fixed classifiers pη(s|·)
(smiling) and pφ(u|·) (gender) when applied to D′test (base-
line) and D′′test (ours), as well as the FID score. We observe
that the privacy increases with larger  for both methods
while the utility decreases.
In Table 2 we present the results of evaluating the accu-
racy of the fixed classifier pη(s|·) on the dataset {x′′i , s′i}mi=1
where x′′i = g(x
′
i, s
′
iz
(2)
i ) is the image censored with our
method and s′i is the new synthetic attribute uniformly sam-
pled from {0, 1}. That is, we measure how often the clas-
sifier predict the new synthetic attribute s′i when applied
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ours (entropy loss)
baseline
ours (baseline loss)
baseline (entropy loss)
ours (entropy loss)
baseline
ours (baseline loss)
baseline (entropy loss)
Figure 3. Privacy vs utility trade-off where the sensitive attribute is smiling (left), and gender (right). Privacy is measured using the
adversarial classifiers pf (s|·), pg(s|·) and pg◦f (s|·), which had access to the non-censored labels for the censored images in the training
set. Average utility is the accuracy of fixed classifiers of attributes other than the sensitive one (for Gender, Wearing Lipstick, Young,
High Cheekbones, Mouth Slightly Open, Heavy Makeup). Our approach with entropy loss consistently performs better than all other
explored approaches.
to x′′i . We can see that with  = 0.001 the method is on
average able to fool the classifier 82.4% of the time, and
this increases with larger  to a success rate of 91.2% on
average with  = 0.05. We also include these results when
the images have been censored with respect to the attributes
gender, wearing lipstick and young.
We also include results on correlations between classifier
Table 1. The mean accuracy and standard deviation over five differ-
ent random seeds when evaluating the fixed classifiers pη(s|·) and
pφ(u|·) on the held out test data when censored with the baseline
(b-line) and our method, and FID score of the censored images
with varying . The expected accuracy of random guessing on bot-
tom row. Smiling: closer to guessing means more privacy, gender:
higher means more utility. FID: lower is better.
Dist. Fix. smiling Fix. gender FID
 b-line ours b-line ours b-line ours
0.001 58.6 63.1 93.1 91.9 12.3 15.0
±2.6 ±2.4 ±0.5 ±0.7 ±1.1 ±1.0
0.005 53.4 58.8 89.4 89.8 25.5 21.3
±2.9 ±2.3 ±0.6 ±0.7 ±1.9 ±2.6
0.01 50.7 57.9 84.0 86.2 52.4 27.3
±6.0 ±1.2 ±1.3 ±0.9 ±3.6 ±1.6
0.05 50.0 50.5 56.1 63.3 246.2 44.4
±0.0 ±0.5 ±6.3 ±1.5 ±14.7 ±6.2
Guess 50.0 61.4
predictions on a pair of attributes when one attribute has
been synthetically replaced, as seen in Table 3. This is
further discussed in Section 6.
5.2. Qualitative results
In this section we present qualitative results of the baseline
and our method. In Figure 4 we show, from the top row to
the bottom row, the input image x, the censored image x′,
the censored image x′′ with the synthetic attribute s′ = 0
(non-smiling), and the censored image x′′ with the synthetic
attribute s′ = 1 (smiling). A value of  = 0.001 is used
in the first four columns, and  = 0.01 in the last four
columns. The images censored by our method look sharper
and it is less obvious that they are censored. We can see
that the method convincingly generates non-smiling faces
Table 2. The mean accuracy and standard deviation over five
different random seeds for pφ(s|·) evaluated on the data set
{(x′′i , s′i)}mi=1 for varying . That is, the success rate of our method
to fool the fixed classifier that the synthetic sensitive attribute s′ is
in the censored image x′′. Higher is better.
Dist. Synthetic
 Smiling Gender Lipstick Young
0.001 82.4± 2.1 72.9± 1.5 62.2± 3.1 59.2± 1.9
0.005 86.4± 3.7 79.4± 0.6 71.7± 2.4 62.1± 2.5
0.01 87.4± 2.1 85.6± 1.4 77.6± 2.4 59.6± 1.6
0.05 91.2± 2.9 90.3± 4.3 90.6± 4.2 67.7± 2.1
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Table 3. The value of each cell denotes the Pearson’s correlation
coefficient between predictions from a fixed classifier trained to
predict the row attribute and a fixed classifier trained to predict
the column attribute, given that the column attribute has been
censored.
Smiling Gender Lipstick Young
Smiling 1.00 -0.04 0.08 -0.06
Gender -0.07 1.00 -0.44 -0.21
Lipstick 0.14 -0.30 1.00 0.26
Young 0.05 -0.11 0.23 1.00
High Cheekbones 0.14 -0.07 0.15 -0.01
Mouth Open 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.02
Heavy Makeup 0.12 -0.24 0.47 0.22
and smiling faces while most of the other parts of the image
is intact. These images are sampled from models trained
on images of 128x128 pixels resolution. Figure 6 shows
corresponding samples on the same input images, but using
gender as the sensitive attribute.
The gap in visual quality between our method and the base-
line becomes clear when  increase from 0.001 to 0.01. The
images censored by the baseline look blurry while the im-
ages censored by our method still seem to maintain a lot
of the structure from the original image. However, in some
cases, for example in the eighth column, it is perhaps no
longer obvious that the image is of the same person, but
attributes such as gender, hair color and skin tone are still
preserved.
In Figure 5 we present results where the attributes smiling,
gender, wearing lipstick, and young have been censored.
The method fails to disentangle the gender attribute and
the lipstick attribute. This is discussed in more detail in
Section 6.
6. Discussion
In Figure 3 our method consistently has a higher utility at
any given level of privacy compared to the baseline. Further-
more, we can observe that using the entropy loss function
for the filter benefits both the baseline and our method. Both
for smiling and gender being the sensitive attribute, our
method outperforms all other evaluated approaches.
In Table 1, we recognize that the baseline achieves a higher
privacy for small , but point out that for a large value of
 = 0.05 the baseline maintains a very low utility as the
gender prediction is not better than random guessing, and
the FID score is very high. Further, for  = 0.01 our method
achieves a higher utility according to the fixed gender pre-
diction score while maintaining a higher image quality, but
with a lower privacy. However, it should be noted that the
standard deviation is quite high for the smiling prediction
accuracy of the baseline at  = 0.01, and that there are
values lower than random guessing, meaning that if we flip
the prediction the accuracy would increase.
Most importantly, our method demonstrates a higher privacy
in the evaluation with the much stronger adversary as seen
in Figure 3. This shows that our method makes it more
difficult for the adversary to see through the privatization
step. To show the effect of the filter we have included results
using only the generator to privatize the images. Note that
the combination of the filter and the generator works best.
A possible reason why using only the generator does not
achieve high privacy is that the generator architecture is de-
signed to easily learn the identity function to promote trans-
formations that changes the input. Assuming enough capac-
ity, the generator could learn the following rule: if the sensi-
tive attribute in the image that is being censored is the same
as the randomly sampled attribute, let the image through
without changes. Otherwise, apply the -constrained change
that transforms the image into a realistic image with the new
attribute.
If the transformed image is indistinguishable from a real
image this is not a problem, but if it is not we can easily
reverse the privatization by detecting if the image is real
or not. To mitigate this problem the filter always removes
the sensitive data in the image which forces the generator
to synthesize new data. Since the censored image is now
guaranteed to be synthetic, we can no longer do the simple
real/fake attack.
In Table 2, we see that the fixed smile classifier is fooled by
our privatization mechanism in 82.4% to 91.2% of the data
points in the test set (depending on the distortion ). These
results indicate that it may be harder for an adversarially
trained classifier to predict the sensitive attribute when it has
been replaced with something else, as compared to simply
removed. We assume that this is due to the added variability
in the data. Or intuitively: it is easier to “blend in” with
other images that have similar demonstrations of smiles.
In Table 4 we see that some of the other attributes in the
facial images of the CelebA dataset are highly correlated
with whether or not the person is smiling. Two attributes that
are highly correlated with smiling are high cheekbones and
slightly open mouths. It is not obvious that a person with
high cheekbones should be predisposed to smile more often,
rather it may be that a person that is smiling is perceived as
having high cheekbones due to the contraction of the facial
muscles. We can see in Figure 4 that this is captured in all
of the images with a synthetic smile (fourth row). The cheek
muscles are visibly contracted and there are clear dimples
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Figure 4. Qualitative results for the sensitive attribute smile. In the first four columns:  = 0.001, and in the last four columns:  = 0.01.
From top to bottom row: input image (x), censored image (x′), censored image with synthetic non-smile (x′′, s′ = 0), censored image
with synthetic smile (x′′, s′ = 1). The model is able to generate a synthetic smiling attribute while maintaining much of the structure in
the image. These images were generated from a model trained using 128x128 pixels.
Input Smiling Male Lipstick Young
Figure 5. Examples of changing other attributes in an image. Each column (except the first which is the input) corresponds to an attribute
that is being censored, and the top and bottom row show the censored image with the synthesized attribute set to false and true respectively.
in all images. On the other hand, the synthetic images with
non-smile (third row) seem to have much less contracted
facial muscles. We also note that the images with generated
smiles tend to have an open mouth, while the images with a
generated non-smile tend to have a closed mouth.
The fact that many important attributes in facial images cor-
relate leads to the reflection that disentangling the underly-
ing factors of variation is not entirely possible. For example,
in this dataset lipstick is highly correlated with gender. This
means that if we want to hide all information about whether
or not the person is wearing lipstick we also need to hide its
gender (and other correlating attributes). This problem can
be seen in Table 3 where changing whether or not a person
is wearing lipstick correlates with changes of gender.
The question we ask is: if we censor an attribute in an im-
age, how does that correlate with changes of other attributes
in the image? In the lipstick column of Table 3 we have
censored the attribute lipstick. We then make predictions on
whether or not the person in the censored image is wearing
lipstick, and compute the correlation between these predic-
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Figure 6. Qualitative results for the sensitive attribute gender. In the first four columns:  = 0.001, and in the last four columns:  = 0.01.
From top to bottom row: input image (x), censored image (x′), censored image with synthetic female gender (x′′, s′ = 0), censored
image with synthetic male gender (x′′, s′ = 1). The model is able to generate a synthetic gender while maintaining much of the structure
in the image. These images were generated from a model trained using 128x128 pixels.
Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficient between the smiling at-
tribute and 10 other attributes in the CelebA training dataset, or-
dered from high to low absolute correlation.
Attribute Correlation
High cheekbones 0.68
Mouth slightly open 0.53
Rosy cheeks 0.22
Oval face 0.21
Wearing lipstick 0.18
Heavy makeup 0.18
Wearing earrings 0.17
Attractive 0.15
Gender -0.14
Bags under eyes 0.11
tions and predictions for the attributes for each row. For
example, we can see that changes in lipstick correlate nega-
tively with changes in gender and positively with makeup.
This highlights the problem of disentangling these underly-
ing factors of variation. We also see this in Figure 5 where
changing the lipstick attribute to true results in a transforma-
tion that changes the gender from male to female.
One core strength of our method is that it is domain-
preserving, meaning that x, x′′ ∈ X where X denotes the
domain of images. This allows a utility provider to use the
censored image x′′ in existing algorithms without modifica-
tions. Together with our results on the utility preservation,
we envision that we can stack several different such mech-
anisms in a chain to add a selection of privatizations to an
image. This could be useful in social media settings where
people may want to share images, but would like a selection
of attributes to be censored.
7. Conclusions
In this work we have addressed the problem of learning
privacy-preserving adversarial representations for image
data that can censor sensitive attributes by generating a
new synthetic attribute in its place. While previous work
has proposed this method for removing information from a
representation, our approach extends on this and can also
generate new information that looks realistic in its place.
We evaluate our method using adversarially trained clas-
sifiers, and our results show that it is possible to preserve
non-sensitive attributes of the image when performing the
censoring. Further, the results show that the synthetically
added attribute helps in fooling the adversary in the most
challenging setting where the adversary is allowed to be
trained using the output of the privacy mechanism.
Adversarial representation learning for synthetic replacement of private attributes
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